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What Humility Isn’t:
Responsibility and the Judicial Role
Benjamin L. Berger*

WHAT IS HUMILITY?
The Talmud relates a story explaining why the Second Temple was
destroyed in 70 CE.1 This story centres on a man named Bar Kamtza, who
was mistakenly invited to a banquet, and a Rabbi, R’Zechariah ben
Avkulas.
The host of the banquet had instructed his attendant to bring his
friend, Kamtza, to the event. Instead, the attendant brought Bar Kamtza,
who the Talmud describes as the host’s enemy. When the host arrived at
the banquet and found Bar Kamtza, rather than his friend Kamtza, he told
Bar Kamtza to “get up and get out.” Bar Kamtza, no doubt seeking to
avoid embarrassment, offered to pay for his food and drink if only the host
would let him stay. When the host refused, Bar Kamtza offered half the
value of the banquet and, when rebuffed, ultimately offered to pay for the
entire banquet. The host again refused, this time grabbing hold of Bar
Kamtza and physically ejecting him from the event.
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Bar Kamtza was offended not only by the rough treatment at the
hands of the host, but by the fact that the Rabbis looked on without
intervening or objecting to the host’s conduct: “Bar Kamza said to himself:
‘Since the Rabbis were seated at the banquet and did not rebuke him for
the way he treated me, it is evident that what he did was acceptable to
them.’”2 Bar Kamtza resolved to get revenge against the Rabbis.
He went to the leader of the Romans and advised him that the Jews
were rebelling. When asked for proof, Bar Kamtza suggested that the
Romans send an animal as a sacrifice and to watch to see if the Jews would
offer it up in the Temple. If they did not, it would be a sure sign of the
Jews’ resistance. The Romans sent a calf but, on the way to Jerusalem, Bar
Kamtza inflicted a subtle blemish on the animal, one that he knew the Jews
would nevertheless notice and that would render the calf unfit for
sacrifice.
Sure enough, when the sacrifice offering arrived, the blemish was
noticed and all understood the grave situation. The Rabbis considered
offering the animal despite the ritual prohibition, “for the sake of peaceful
relations with the Roman government.” But, according to the Talmud,
Rabbi Zechariah objected that people would then believe that blemished
animals were fit offerings. So the Rabbis instead considered killing Bar
Kamtza so that word of the Rabbis’ refusal to sacrifice the animal would
not reach the Romans. Again Rabbi Zechariah objected: people would
then wrongly believe that the penalty for blemishing a sacrificial animal is
death. And so the Rabbis took neither path. Consistent with Jewish law,
the animal was not sacrificed. Bar Kamtza returned to inform the Roman
authorities. His plan succeeded: the Romans interpreted the refusal of the
sacrifice as evidence of the Jews’ rebellion, besieged Jerusalem, and
destroyed the Holy Temple, a cataclysmic event in the history of the Jewish
people.
The Talmud records that Rabbi Yochanan interrupted his telling of
these events, offering the following observation: “The humility of Rabbi
Zechariah ben Avkulas destroyed our Temple, burned down our
Sanctuary, and exiled us from our land.”3
2

Tractate Gittin, 56a.
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In recent years academic literature has given some attention to
humility as an important adjudicative principle or virtue. In the hands of
some, the concept is rather thin. It is merely a synonym for restraint,
describing a principle of judicial deference to legislative or democratic
choices or debates.4 For these authors, a judge’s humility is measured
simply by asking whether and how often she or he is willing to overrule
or strike down legislation,5 or intervene to decide contentious social
issues.6 Here, the call for judicial humility is a response to a concern about
“judicial activism,” sometimes quite neatly folded into polemical
interventions on particular legal controversies.7
The virtue of judicial humility is thickened up by others who regard
the core of humility as a deep awareness of the fallibility of human
judgment and the risk of error when met with the difficult, sometimes
excruciating, choices that must be made by a judge. Humility is, here,
about “tempering judicial arrogance”8 and counsels an openness to
hearing the views of others and listening to the wisdom of other
authorities and sources. Simone Chambers builds on this sense of humility
as an attunement to human fallibility, describing it not only as a question
related to the imperfection of our knowledge and judgment, but as “an
acknowledgment of shared human frailty and weakness in the face of

4

Michael J. Gerhardt, “Constitutional Humility” (2007) 76 Cin. L. Rev. 23.

5

Id. Although Scharffs develops a richer conception of humility, he ultimately also regards
deference, an allergy to significant change, and avoidance of “activism” as markers for judicial
humility. Brett Scharffs, “The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom” (1998) 32 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 127.
6

Richard S. Myers, “The Virtue of Judicial Humility” (2015) 13:2 Ave Maria Law Review 207.

See Id., at 212–213. Myers writes his piece in anticipation of the US Supreme Court’s
consideration of same sex marriage, hoping to avoid “the distorting effect of the Supreme Court’s
intervention.”
7

Michael W. McConnell, “The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Reading of the Constitution” (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, at
1292.
8
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contingency and constraint”9 — an attitude that will lead a judge to close
the imaginative gap between her and an unfortunate person who appears
before her.10
Arguing for the virtue of humility in constitutional discourse, Mark
Walters builds on this idea of humility as linked to human fallibility and
frailties in our understanding, as a kind of salve for judicial arrogance. For
Walters, “[i]f constitutional law is a moral discourse, and if moral
discourse embraces moral insight and tragedy simultaneously, then
constitutional humility is essential.”11 He observes that “[h]umility is not
often identified as a constitutional value, at least not in the non-aboriginal
legal tradition. Law is supposed to be about authority, certainty, and
order; humility, in contrast, suggests meekness and modesty.”12 To
embrace humility, in this sense, instills a desire to relate to and understand
the perspectives of others and a willingness to reconsider one’s past
decisions.
The view that humility is, at core, about care and concern for the
perspectives of others inspires Lindsay Borrows’s reflections on the
principle of humility.13 In the richest conception available in the existing
legal literature — enriched by deep engagement with Anishinaabe
teachings about humility — she describes humility as “a state of being that
can open hearts and minds to see a situation in different ways.” 14 Her

9

Simone Chambers, “Democratizing Humility” (2004) 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 465, at 470–471.

Chambers is writing of the criminal realm, and describes this effect of humility as follows: “we
are asked to think about our law abidingness as possibly and partially a product of many
arbitrary, accidental, and contingent factors. It gives us an impartial perspective on ourselves and
our own sense of justice." Id., at 471–472.
10

11

Mark D. Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 470.

12

Id., at 474. In this lovely piece, Walters opposes his view, inspired by the work of John
Whyte, to that of Ronald Dworkin (as evidenced in Law’s Empire), which shows tremendous
confidence in the capacity for moral progress through law.
Lindsay Borrows, “Dabaadendiziwin: Practices of Humility in a Multi-Juridical Legal
Landscape” (2016) 33 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 149. See also Lindsay Keegitah Borrows,
Otter’s Journey through Indigenous Language and Law (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2018), at
136.
13

14

Id., at 152.
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understanding of humility elegantly weaves together many of the threads
that I have identified:
Humility is a state of positioning oneself in a way that does
not favour one's own importance over another's. Humility
is a condition of being teachable. Humility allows us to
recognize our dependence upon others and to consider their
perspectives along with our own. A humble opinion may be
given in a spirit of deference or submission. The antonym is
expressed in terms such as arrogant, elevated, or prideful.15
This is the “legal principle” of humility that Borrows argues should be
more actively cultivated in Canadian and Anishinaabe law.
I, too, have argued for the importance of humility as an adjudicative
virtue, one that is particularly important in navigating the encounter of
Canadian constitutionalism with other cultural forms, including religion.16
The conception of humility that I advanced resonated with the sentiment
that Robert Cover hoped would install itself in the judge who understood
that the act of adjudication involves violence to other rich worlds of
meaning.17 As Judith Resnik explains, Cover “wanted the state’s actors
(here, its judges and, derivatively, commentators on their work) to be
uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own power, respectful of the
legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the possibility that
multiple meanings and divergent practices ought sometimes to be
tolerated, even if painfully so.”18 This, too, is a conception of judicial
humility.
Together, these richer views offer an appealing set of practices,
attitudes, and sentiments that would be induced though the cultivation of
this judicial virtue: modesty, gentleness, awareness of one’s fallibility, an
openness to learning, curiosity about and engagement with the
15

Id., at 153–154.

Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism
(Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2015), at 173–177.
16

Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983)
97 Harv. L. Rev. 4.
17

Judith Resnik, “Living Their legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert
Cover” (2005) 17 Yale J.L. & Human. 17, at 25.
18
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perspectives of others, respect for and deference to other decision-makers
and institutions. These are all, surely, features of humility, and all noble
ones at that. And yet these understandings of humility have another
common feature, shared by the thinnest and the thickest alike. In their
various ways and despite their differences, all are urging the judge to be,
in a word, “smaller” — to occupy less space. Whether merely a pallid
encoding of a call for restraint in judicial review of legislation or a vibrant
vision of all that is involved in not becoming enchanted with one’s own
importance, all principally deploy humility to combat excesses: arrogance,
self-elevation, and pridefulness.19 This is understandable; those excesses
are no doubt at work in a judiciary and in need of attention. There is good
to be found in encouraging judges to be “smaller,” and framing this in the
language of humility is effective and compelling. But I have become
uncomfortable with the adequacy of this understanding of humility and
this piece is an exploration of this discomfort.
The Talmud’s curious tale of Bar Kamtza and Rabbi Zechariah —
and the arresting conclusion that Rabbi Yochanan draws from it — offers
a different lesson about the nature of humility. It suggests that the picture
of judicial humility painted in the legal commentary is not only
incomplete, but even potentially dangerous in its incompleteness. Rabbi
Yochanan’s statement is perplexing by the light of these conventional
conceptions of humility. On these accounts, humility is a good to be
pursued, particularly by those in authority. How could one of the defining
tragedies of the history of the Jews be laid at the feet of humility? Yet Rabbi
Yochanan seems to conclude both that Rabbi Zechariah acted with
humility and that this exercise of humility was the cause of the destruction
of the second temple and the exile of the Jewish people. Rabbi Zechariah
did not assume authority beyond the letter of the law, nor did he arrogate
to himself the task of deciding this crucial question facing the Jewish
people. He simply explained what the law said and let events unfold. He
was small. But this was precisely his error of humility.
The lesson of this puzzling episode in the Talmud is that humility
is not merely the opposite of pride, arrogance, or self-importance. Though
Although this is the focus of Borrows’s treatment of humility, she alludes to the dimension of
humility that is my focus in this piece when she notes that “[s]pace must be taken up as
necessary, just as it must be given away at times as well.” Borrows, supra note 14, at 157.
19
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these attitudes, and the habits that follow from them, are all inconsistent
with humility, they all flow from a common and more fundamental source:
a flawed sense of oneself and one’s position in relation to others. This is
the essential pathology that signals a failure of humility. Rabbi Zechariah
acted modestly, but, as one commentator puts it, “[h]is sense of himself
was flawed because he saw himself as less capable than he actually was of
solving a real-life dilemma of great consequence.”20 The failure in Rabbi
Zechariah’s humility was that he resiled from the decision, with disastrous
consequences. In this respect, both arrogance and diffidence can be
understood as problems of ego because both flow from placing the self too
much as the centre of things — one resulting in the elevation above others,
the other in the negation of responsibility towards them. Humility is, thus,
better understood as attunement to one’s appropriate position and role in
a web of relationships with others. Drawing from this story, it might be
said that humility also involves an awareness of power, of the
consequences of power for others, and assuming one’s appropriate place
in the exercise of that power. It is a virtue based in awareness of and
responsibility to others, not merely the antithesis of arrogance or certainty.
Or, if you prefer, it is not about being as small as you can be, it is about
taking an appropriate amount of space.
It is this feature of humility — awareness of one’s role and position
in respect of power and willingness to accept the burdens of responsibility
that flow from this — that I want to isolate and explore in this piece,
seeking to complete the picture of what judicial humility might entail.
With prevailing understandings of judicial humility in hand — and
at a time when case names like Insite,21 Carter,22 and Bedford23 ring in our
ears — it might seem counterintuitive to reflect on the way in which Chief
Justice McLachlin and the McLachlin Court evidenced the virtue of
20

Alan Morinis, Everyday Holiness: The Jewish Spiritual Path of Mussar (Boston & London:
Trumpeter, 2007), at 49.
21

Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011]
3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”].
22

Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Bedford”].
23

Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Carter”].
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humility in currents of the criminal justice jurisprudence. But that is
precisely what I hope to do, focussed instead on this particular feature or
understanding of humility that I have drawn out in this first part of this
paper. In the next section I will look at three somewhat less celebrated
cases that show this facet of judicial humility at work. And yet my claim
is most certainly not triumphal or apologetic, suggesting that this
conception of humility was fully or evenly realized in Chief Justice
McLachlin’s work or that of the McLachlin court. I am drawing out an
ethical resource in the jurisprudence, something I take to be a noble
component of the judicial role, and one that I think should be more sharply
noted and cultivated, alongside the important aspects of humility that
Walters, Borrows, and other “rich theorists” of humility have identified.
And so the penultimate section will identify an area in the criminal justice
system in which there have been meaningful failures of the humility
involved in mindful positioning and acceptance of the burdens of
responsibility.
THE SHAPE OF JUDICIAL HUMILITY
I turn now to consider how this understanding of humility as a
complex virtue involving awareness of one’s appropriate position and
responsibilities in relationship with others can find expression in the
judicial role. The cases below are drawn from decisions of the Supreme
Court concerning the criminal justice system because it is an area of law
that seems particularly, if not uniquely, adept at drawing the complex
burdens of the judicial role into high relief. I offer each case study as a site
for exposing and exploring the juridical expression of the facet of humility
that is of interest to me in this piece: its relationship to responsibility. The
salutary attitudes and practices that other writers have associated with
humility are also variously at work in these cases. My point is that a
satisfying conception of the virtue of judicial humility involves embedding
these attitudes and practices of modesty within an awareness of role and
relationships, with particular attentiveness to power and its consequences,
along with a willingness to accept the associated burdens of judgment.
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Humility, Responsibility, and Vulnerability
Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)24 brought
before the Court the constitutionality of Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code,25
the part of Code that governs the treatment of accused persons found not
criminal responsible by reason of mental disorder (“NCR accused”).
Parliament enacted Part XX.1 in 1991 in response to the decision in Swain,26
in which the Court ruled unconstitutional the prior scheme by which
accused found “not guilty by reason of insanity” would be detained
automatically and indefinitely at the “pleasure of the Lieutenant
Governor.” Part XX.1 instituted sweeping revisions to the treatment of
mentally disordered offenders, including the introduction of a new verdict
that was neither “guilty” nor “not guilty” but, rather, “not criminally
responsible.” But it was the new approach to treatment, detention, and
restrictions on liberty that was at issue in Winko. Under Part XX.1, a court
or, more commonly, a Review Board is required to make a determination
as to whether the NCR accused should be discharged absolutely (thereby
releasing him or her from the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system),
discharged with conditions, or detained in custody in a hospital. In
coming to this decision, a Review Board is required to take into
consideration “the need to protect the public from dangerous persons, the
mental condition of the accused, the reintegration of the accused into
society and the other needs of the accused”. Mr. Winko objected that this
scheme — as interpreted to that point — presumed the dangerousness of
the NCR accused and placed on that accused the burden of proving the
contrary, in contravention of his section 7 and 15(1) rights.
Although the case raised constitutional issues, it turned on a
question of statutory interpretation: Did Part XX.1, indeed, create such a
presumption of dangerousness?27 The focal point of the case was section
24

[1999] S.C.J. No. 31, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Winko”].

25

R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

26

R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.).

27

Although this was the core issue, Winko is more generally, a touchstone case establishing the
posture that the Canadian criminal justice system would take toward those who, by reason of
mental disorder, cannot be held criminally responsible. Justice McLachlin explains, for example,
that the sole basis for the justice system’s claim over the NCR accused is danger to the public
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672.54(a), which states that “where a verdict of not criminally responsible
on account of mental disorder has been rendered in respect of the accused
and, in the opinion of the court or Review Board, the accused is not a
significant threat to the safety of the public,” the Review Board must, “by
order, direct that the accused be discharged absolutely.” And to put a fine
point on it, the central question was, What should a Review Board do in a
condition of uncertainty about whether the accused is a significant threat to
the safety of the public? If the evidence supports a positive finding that
the accused is a significant threat to the safety of the public, the result was
clear: the accused should not be discharged absolutely. Equally clear was
that if a Review Board concluded that the NCR accused was not such a
threat, he or she should be discharged absolutely. But what if the evidence
couldn’t support a clear finding in one direction or another?
Justice Gonthier (with whom L’Heureux Dubé J. concurred) held
that if a Review Board finds that if there is uncertainty as to whether an
NCR accused who presents some danger to the public is a significant threat,
that NCR accused should be subject to conditions or detained. Perhaps
more time and future information would resolve the issue, but in the
meantime the criminal justice system should retain its warrant over the
mentally ill individual. Justice Gonthier defended this as the plain
meaning of the text. By contrast, Justice McLachlin, as she then was and
writing for the majority, effectively denied that there was space for such
uncertainty or indecision. If the Review Board could not conclude that the
NCR accused presented a significant threat to the safety of the public, the
decision was made: the individual must be discharged unconditionally.
In arriving at this conclusion, Justice McLachlin’s reasons faithfully
express the extraordinarily difficult nature of the choice facing a criminal
justice system and, on an individual basis, each Review Board: “In every
society there are those who commit criminal acts because of mental illness.
The criminal law must find a way to deal with these people fairly, while
protecting the public against further harms. The task is not an easy one.”28
The gravest concerns lie in each direction. There would be considerable
solace to be found in some room for indecision. One could perhaps
and that the orientation of the Part XX.1 approach is towards assessment and treatment, not
punishment.
28

Winko, supra note 24, at para. 1.
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imagine a review board member, taking her cue from Rabbi Zachariah,
objecting alternatively, “but if we discharge this person, they might cause
harm to someone!” and “but if we don’t discharge this person, we have
deprived them of their basic liberty without justification!”. Justice
McLachlin denies the decision-maker this comfort. She explains that
“however difficult the task, the court or Review Board cannot avoid the
responsibility of making that determination.”29
Humility understood solely in terms of awareness of fallibility and
embrace of uncertainty would not dictate this approach. But I read Justice
McLachlin’s conclusion in Winko as a fine instantiation of the more
complete picture of humility that I have been urging. Consistent with
prevailing accounts of humility, her reasons in Winko are rich with an
attempt to understand the lives of others. She reflects on the circumstances
that brought Mr. Winko before the courts and insists on moving past
stereotypes about the dangerousness of the mentally ill and thinking
realistically about their lives, noting that evidence does not support the
proposition that NCR accused are more likely than others to commit future
offences.30 She is seeking to engage compassionately with the perspectives
and experiences of others. But she also, and crucially, emphasizes the
unique vulnerability of the mentally ill in our society and in relation to our
justice system. Justice McLachlin notes the “socially marginalizing sideeffects”31 of mental illness. She observes the historical mistreatment of the
mentally ill who “have long been subject to negative stereotyping and
social prejudice in our society based on an assumption of
dangerousness”.32 And she refers explicitly to the fact that “the mentally
ill are often vulnerable and victimized in the prison setting, as well as by
changes in the health system that many suggest result in greater numbers
of the mentally ill being caught up in the criminal process”.33
Justice McLachlin is, here, drawing herself and the court or Review
Board facing this admittedly difficult choice into explicit awareness of the
29

Id., at para. 51.

30

Id., at para. 37.

31

Id., at para. 37.

32

Id., at para. 35.

33

Id., at para. 41.
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power dynamics and vulnerabilities that shape that moment, as well as the
enormous consequences of the decision for the affected communities.
With this she is inducing a keener appreciation of the role and
responsibilities of the decision-maker, burdensome though they may be.
The overriding duty of the decision-maker in this situation is to ensure that
the NCR accused is “treated with the utmost dignity and afforded the
utmost liberty compatible with his or her situation.”34 Attunement to the
vulnerability of the mentally ill, the consequences for them of the exercise
of the criminal law’s power, and one’s unique position standing between
that power and consequence, require the acceptance of this duty. This is
so despite how much one might prefer not to make the decision, to protect
oneself from the burden of that choice. And this, it seems to me, is a true
counsel of humility.
Winko thus serves as an example that evidence of the virtue of
judicial humility is not found merely in a refusal to invalidate legislation,
though with her interpretation of Part XX.1 in hand, McLachlin J. found
the legislation constitutionally valid. It is a much more complicated matter
than that, one that involves a judge positioning herself within a web of
relationships with others. And in pursuing the virtue of judicial humility,
those salient relationships are much broader than solely those between the
judiciary and the other branches of government. The judge is a responsible
member of a more complex community than that, and with more complex
duties. In Winko, Justice McLachlin was keenly aware that this community
of regard included those suffering with mental illness and that the Court’s
decision would have profound impacts on their lives, as well as the safety
of the public. In this, she not only asked courts and Review Boards to
accept the burdens of their responsibilities, she humbly did so herself.
Humility, Responsibility, and History
A judge working with the common law is engaged in a relationship
with history. When that judge confronts a legal rule or principle applicable
to a given case before her, she is, in that moment, participating in the
unfolding of a tradition. With this, she faces the formidable question:
34

Id., at para. 42.
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Receiving, through this rule or principle, the accumulated wisdom of past
experience and judgment, what is my appropriate relationship to this
history as I wrestle with contemporary circumstances and the case before
me? Principles of stare decisis and adherence to precedent embody one
stance with respect to this question — one posture towards this legal
history — and shape the inherently conservative dimension of the
common law. Here, the judge’s role is to receive the wisdom of past
decisions and draw them forward to the present. But of course change is
also a genetic aspect of the common law and the source of its dynamism.
This facet of the common law reflects a fundamental understanding that,
as Michael Oakeshott puts it, “[t]here is nothing to encourage us to believe
that … what is better survives more readily than what is worse”35 and that,
as society changes and new circumstances emerge, history cannot exhaust
our insight about justice. And so to bring this question into the terms of
this piece, one might ask, What does judicial humility mean or demand for
this engagement with history?
This question frames my examination of Justice McLachlin’s (as she
then was) decision in R. v. Khan,36 a decision that, in terms of its effects on
our legal system, must be considered one of the most important and
consequential of her career. Khan concerned the admissibility of a young
child’s unsworn statements, made to her mother, regarding a sexual
assault. Although the Court’s decision, authored by McLachlin J., clarified
certain points about the approach to the testimonial competence of
children, the crucial intervention of the case was on the analysis of hearsay.
The child, T., was three and a half years old at the time of the incident. She
had gone to the doctor with her mother. The doctor, Dr. Khan, first
examined T. with her mother in the room. While her mother changed for
her own examination, T. was alone with Dr. Khan in his office. After the
examination, when the mother rejoined T., she noticed that the child was
picking at a wet spot on her sleeve. Approximately 15 minutes after
leaving Dr. Khan, the mother asked T. what she and Dr. Khan talked about
when they were alone. The young girl then conveyed that Dr. Khan asked
her if she wanted a candy, then told her to open her mouth and “put his
Michael Oakeshott, “The Character of a University Education” in Luke O’Sullivan, ed, What is
HIstory? and other essays (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 373, at 377.
35
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khan”].
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birdie in my mouth, shook it and peed in my mouth.”37 The mother
testified that “birdie” was T.’s word for “penis”. The police were called,
the spot on the sleeve was examined and found to be a deposit of semen,
and Dr. Khan was charged with sexual assault.
The evidentiary difficulty that became the legal core of Khan was
that the trial judge found that T., only approximately four and a half years
old at the time of the trial, was not competent to testify. This meant that
the key evidence — what T. said to her mother about what occurred —
could only be presented to the court through the mother, making it hearsay
and, therefore, presumptively inadmissible. Finding no applicable
exceptions to the hearsay rule, the trial judge excluded this crucial
evidence and acquitted the accused. The Crown appealed and the case
found its way to the Supreme Court.
Justice McLachlin corrected certain errors in the trial judge’s
competency analysis, but the central question of the hearsay remained.
And the core difficulty was this: Justice McLachlin concluded that the trial
judge was right that no traditional hearsay exceptions applied and was
therefore correct that the statements were inadmissible on the basis of
prevailing hearsay rules. The choice before the Court was, therefore, to
stand by these hearsay rules, which reflect an historical set of judgments
about the safety of relying on certain types of information, or to reshape
the rule. The matter drew particular importance from the context in which
it appeared, namely the prosecution of an alleged sexual offence against a
young child, a category of vulnerable persons from whom direct evidence
would often be difficult to obtain in court. Justice McLachlin framed the
essential issue before the Court as follows:
The question then is the extent to which, if at all, the
strictures of the hearsay rule should be relaxed in the case of
children’s testimony. The issue is one of great importance in
view of the increasing number of prosecutions for sexual
offences against children and the hardships that often attend
requiring children to retell and relive the frequently
traumatic events surrounding the episode in a long series of

37

Id., at para. 4.
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encounters with parents, social workers, police and finally
different levels of courts.38
Attuned to this practical context, McLachlin J. acknowledged that
the “hearsay rule has traditionally been regarded as an absolute rule,
subject to various categories of exceptions” and that this approach
“provided a degree of certainty to the law on hearsay”.39 However she
concluded that the approach “has frequently proved unduly inflexible in
dealing with new situations and new needs in the law.”40 For the purposes
of this piece, a moment in the flow of her reasoning stands out. In
reviewing the case of Ares v. Venner,41 which provided some support for
the approach she would take, she paused to emphasize a line that the
Court had accepted from a dissenting judgment penned by Lord Donovan
in a 1965 English case, Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions: “The
common law is moulded by the judges and it is still their province to adapt
it from time to time so as to make it serve the interests of those it binds.”42
So Justice McLachlin counselled a return to the “principle and the
policy underlying the hearsay rule rather than the strictures of traditional
exceptions.”43 She excavated the historical decisions to expose the core
concerns animating the hearsay prohibition, namely that hearsay evidence
might not be necessary and might be unreliable, and concluded that
hearsay statements made by children regarding crimes committed against
the child should therefore be admitted if they are, indeed, necessary and
reliable.44 T.’s mother’s evidence should have been admitted: it was
necessary, the child having been ruled incompetent to testify, and the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, features of the
statement, and the corroborative evidence gave her hearsay statement the
38

Id., at para. 17.

39

Id., at para. 18.

40

Id.

41

[1970] S.C.R. 608, [1970] R.C.S. 608 (S.C.C.).

42

Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881, [1965] A.C. 1001, at 1047
(H.L.).
43

Khan, supra note 36 at para. 18.

And “subject to such safeguards as the judge may consider necessary and subject always to
considerations affecting the weight that should be accorded to such evidence.” Id., at para. 33.
44
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stamp of reliability. Subsequent cases would recognize that the logic of
McLachlin J.’s approach could not be contained to the case of child
witnesses, and that the principled approach to hearsay — focussing on
necessity and reliability — would define the whole of the Court’s
subsequent hearsay jurisprudence.45
But what informed Justice McLachlin’s decision to reshape the
approach to hearsay in Khan? The law of evidence occupies a special place
in the landscape of our justice system: it is the law’s practical epistemology,
its way of knowing the social world that it is asked to judge. As such, there
is no path to a just outcome that can bypass the gates of evidence law.
Chief Justice McLachlin was keenly attuned to this structural significance
of our rules of evidence and her formidable contributions to the field of
evidence law should be counted amongst her most important. In Khan she
was specifically attentive to the practical consequences of the law for those
who it would affect, here vulnerable children. And as evidenced by her
invocation of Lord Donovan’s dissent in Myers, this awareness of the
consequences of her decision was married with a keen appreciation of her
role as a judge in relationship not only to inherited wisdom and rules, but
the communities affected by her decision.
If not the starting point — a matter on which there is substantial
(though inconsequential) academic debate — Justice McLachlin’s
conceptual move in Khan was the watershed for what is considered the
“principled revolution” in the modern Canadian evidence law. It
reshaped our approach to evidence. Far from modest in its effect, the
decision nevertheless showed humility because it involved a judge’s
thoughtful reflection on her role and responsibilities in the web of
relationships and lived experiences in which she discharges her duties.
Those relationships importantly include a relationship with history and
the wisdom generated through historical experience. Although adherence
to inherited rules and principles in light of the weight of that history might
be more consistent with the lack of arrogance and modesty often
associated with humility, it is not a reflection of the more complex picture
of the virtue that I have been urging in this piece. As a judge, it is not
45

The general applicability of her approach to hearsay was explicitly recognized in R. v. Smith,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 74, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.), and would carry through to our guiding
jurisprudence today (see R. v. Bradshaw, [2017] S.C.J. No. 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865 (S.C.C.)).
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enough to receive and apply rules and laws, as Rabbi Zechariah did. Nor
can they be callously disregarded as if the experience and wisdom that
generated them has no claim on us. Both approaches lack humility
because both fail to occupy appropriate space. Khan is an example that
shows that we find judicial humility at the confluence of respectful
engagement with history and awareness of the responsibilities of one’s
role in the moment. This is perhaps one of the defining burdens we ask a
judge to accept: to wrestle with history, not just to receive it.
Humility, Responsibility, and the Role of Others
The combined effect of R. v. Nur46 and R. v. Lloyd,47 both with
majority decisions penned by Chief Justice McLachlin, has been to sound
the death knell for most mandatory minimum sentences. In Lloyd, she
explains that “the reality” is that mandatory minimum sentences
applicable to a breadth of circumstances and possible offenders are
constitutionally vulnerable “because such laws will almost inevitably
include an acceptable reasonable hypothetical for which the mandatory
minimum will be found unconstitutional.”48 She goes on to suggest that if
Parliament wishes to persist in the use of mandatory minimums, it must
more narrowly circumscribe their applicability or offer a legislative “safety
valve” to judges. The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent jurisprudence on
the question of the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences
thus hardly seems a promising archive for reflection on the judicial virtue
of humility, as it is often understood. Nur and Lloyd are large, bold,
confident — to some, institutionally arrogant — decisions. But the axial
jurisprudential moment leading to these cases, R. v. Ferguson,49 is a
decision that indeed discloses dimensions of the more complex picture of
humility that I am developing here.

46

[2015] S.C.J. No. 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”].

47

[2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lloyd”].

48

Id., at para. 35.

49

[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”].

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269547

Forthcoming in Daniel Jutras and Marcus Moore, eds., The Chief: Essays in Honor of Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin (Pre-publication Version)

The case came from Chief Justice McLachlin’s home town, Pincher
Creek, Alberta, and involved the fatal shooting of a police detainee by an
RCMP constable. Constable Ferguson would later testify that while
placing the detainee, Mr. Varley, in cells, Varley attacked him, pulling his
vest over his head and grabbing Cst. Ferguson’s firearm. In the ensuing
struggle, one shot was discharged into the detainee’s stomach, wounding
him. The booking officer would testify that he heard the second, and fatal,
headshot up to three seconds later.
At issue was the constitutionality of the four year mandatory
minimum sentence for manslaughter with a firearm. Ferguson did not
challenge the general constitutionality of the minimum but, rather, argued
that, as applied to his circumstances, this four year minimum constituted
cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12, and that the
appropriate remedy would be a constitutional exemption granted
pursuant to the wide remedial power conferred on courts by section 24(1)
of the Charter. Chief Justice McLachlin found no basis for concluding that
the four year mandatory minimum sentence offended section 12 on the
(distinctly unsympathetic) facts of this case. Nevertheless, and though a
decision on this point was not strictly required given her finding on the
section 12 question, McLachlin C.J.C. turned to what would be the key
question in the case: what is the appropriate remedy when a violation of
section 12 is, indeed, found? Should that law “be permitted to stand
subject to constitutional exemptions in particular cases”, granted pursuant
to section 24(1) of the Charter, as Ferguson had argued, or is “the only
remedy … a declaration that the law is inconsistent with the Charter and
hence falls under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982”?50
Chief Justice McLachlin held that courts should not grant
constitutional exemptions pursuant to their section 24(1) remedial power.
Section 24(1), she explained, is to be used in response to government acts
that violate Charter rights.51 If, by contrast, it is a law that offends the
Charter, courts are limited to “striking down” the law as being of no force
and effect under section 52.

50

Id., at para. 34.

51

Id., at para. 61.
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At the time, some viewed this conclusion in Ferguson as
representing the Court’s unfortunate withdrawal from its appropriate role
in relieving particular instances of injustice arising from mandatory
minimum sentences. Constitutional exemptions offered “a workable
solution to the problem of the exceptional case”52 and some worried that
Ferguson marked a retreat from close scrutiny of minimum sentences. And
yet in retrospect, Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasons in Ferguson are better
read as a muscular intervention in the politics and legality of mandatory
minimum sentences,53 setting the stage for Nur and Lloyd. She denied
judges the easy way out — episodically releasing tensions while sustaining
the law produced by the politics of mandatory minimums. Far from an
abdication of the necessary role of the courts, the decision served as an
encouragement to judges to take the step required of them given their
constitutional role: to recognize that a law that would inflict cruel or
unusual punishment lacks the political morality within the structure of our
constitutional order to stand as law. The world announced in Lloyd — one
in which mandatory minimum sentences are all constitutionally suspect
— is a world that Ferguson made.
But what does this all have to do with humility? The answer lies in
how Chief Justice McLachlin arrived at this conclusion in Ferguson.
Acknowledging the appeal of constitutional exemptions as a more surgical
and flexible response to the excesses of mandatory minimum sentences,
her rejection of this approach was very much anchored in a concern about
the potential for interference with the appropriate role of Parliament. She
notes that constitutional exemptions, though they might initially appear
less intrusive, “may in fact represent an inappropriate intrusion on the
legislature’s role”54 inasmuch as their use would effectively amend the
52

Lisa Dufraimont, "R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to Mandatory
Minimum Sentences under Section 12" (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459 at 470. See also Peter W.
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf ed., vol. 2 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007),
at 40-21. Hogg approved of the use of constitutional exemptions in minimum sentence cases,
saying that there was “much to be said for it” in that “[i]t would enable the courts to keep in force
a minimum sentence that was not disproportionate in the great majority of its applications, while
applying normal sentencing principles to the rare set of facts where the defendant’s lack of moral
culpability would make the minimum sentence cruel and unusual.”
I suggested this interpretation of Ferguson in “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of
Minimum Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101.
53
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Ferguson, supra note 49, at para. 50.
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legislation by conferring a discretion on judges that Parliament did not
intend. This concern sounds in a register consonant with familiar
understandings of judicial humility — that it involves judicial withdrawal
and restraint in order to allow free space for Parliament’s judgments. The
problem with resting on this reading of the Chief Justice’s concerns is it
fails to account for the transformative role that Ferguson would come to
play in the field.
In fact, the spirit of Chief Justice’s concern about interference with
Parliament’s role is not solely, or even primarily, animated by an attitude
of deference. As she reflects on what the Constitution and the rule of law
say about the responsibility of courts when faced with unconstitutional
legislation, the picture becomes more complex and interesting. The
Constitution, she says, gives a clear answer to what a court must do with
an unconstitutional law: it must be declared of no force or effect. This is
important to Chief Justice McLachlin because, the unconstitutional
provision having been struck down, “the ball is thrown back into
Parliament’s court, to revise the law, should it choose to do so, so that it no
longer produces unconstitutional effects.”55 And as she considers the
responsibility of courts, she turns to their central role in guarding the rule
of law, and observes that providing constitutional exemptions not only
produces lack of clarity and predictability at the formal level but that “the
divergence between the law on the books and the law as applied — and
the uncertainty and unpredictability that result — exacts a price paid in
the coin of injustice.”56 This divergence impairs the right of citizens to
know the law, risks the overapplication of unjust laws, and creates barriers
to the realization of the rights of those subject to the authority of these
laws.
Having canvassed these various role and mandates, Chief Justice
McLachlin’s reasons culminate in a way that sheds light on her
fundamental concern about the relationship between Parliament and the
courts, and with it on what a humble acceptance of responsibility in
relation to the role of others demands. It is not that the courts must
withdraw and exercise restraint in order to allow Parliament open space
in which to act. Rather, a court must do its own job boldly and effectively
55

Id., at para. 65.
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Id., at para. 72.
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— it must strike down unconstitutional laws — in order to make the shape
of Parliament’s role and responsibilities, in light of the real consequences
of its decisions, clear to Parliament itself. This is the very note on which
she concludes her analysis: “Bad law, fixed up on a case-by-case basis by
the courts, does not accord with the role and responsibility of Parliament
to enact constitutional laws for the people of Canada.”57 In Ferguson,
McLachlin C.J.C. was concerned with the courts’ relationship to
Parliament, but the point is more broadly applicable. Responsibly
occupying one’s appropriate space —the heart of humility — is, in fact, an
exercise in calling for others to do the same.
This is precisely what Rabbi Zechariah failed to do. But the Talmud
relates another curious reflection on the nature of humility that captures
this dimension of the virtue, richly understood. Rabbi Chelbo recounts
that Rav Huna once said, “Anyone who sets a particular place for himself
to pray in the synagogue, the God of Abraham stands in his aid, and when
he dies, people say of him, ‘This was a humble person.’”58 How can it be
that reliably occupying a spot in the synagogue is an expression of
humility? Perhaps the answer is that it clarifies the shape of things for
others as they seek to responsibly occupy their own space.
POLICE POWERS AND FAILURES OF JUDICIAL HUMILITY
Thus far this piece has been concerned with exposing a different
face of judicial humility. I have done so by looking to three judgments
penned by Chief Justice McLachlin, together displaying a more complex
picture of humility as the effort to assume one’s appropriate place in
relationship with others, attuned to the workings of power and history, the
vulnerabilities of those around us, and a particular form of attentiveness
to the roles of others. The attitudes, sentiments, and practices associated
with the more common picture of humility — such as awareness of
fallibility, compassion, openness to learning, and modesty — are really just
aspects of this more complete understanding of humility. And as these
three cases drawn from aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence on the
57

Id., at para. 73.

58

Tractate B’rachot 6b, translation taken from Morinis, supra note 20, at 49.
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criminal justice system show, sometimes that practice requires asserting
oneself and confidently assuming one’s proper space, not simply being as
small as one can be.
But this is just an ethical resource to be found in the case law. The
cases are examples from a complex and vast jurisprudence that is also
filled with counter examples. The attitude and practice of humility I have
developed here is at work and available in the Court’s jurisprudence and
in Chief Justice McLachlin’s work, but it would be too much to say that it
defines either. Indeed, having found this important ethical thread within
McLachlin C.J.C.’s jurisprudence concerning the criminal justice system, it
is also in this field that I find a body of law that displays the failing of this
form of humility. Humility is a virtue to be worked towards, not an
already-realized feature of the Supreme Court’s work or that of any given
judge of the Court. It is therefore important to point to where the
dimensions of humility at play in cases like Winko, Khan, and Ferguson have
been absent, and with pernicious consequences for our law and those it
affects.
Over the last many years, the Court has benefitted from a
developing narrative about its progressive, skeptical take on the
expansions of crime and punishment. Cases like Insite, Bedford, and Carter
have shown the Court’s concern about the scope of the criminal law and
the limits of criminalization. The Court’s jurisprudence on mandatory
minimum sentences that I have touched on in this piece, most notably Nur
and Lloyd, and to some extent its attention to the insidious character of the
overincarceration of Indigenous peoples,59 has evidenced similar concern
and an inclination toward restraint in respect of sentencing and
punishment. All of these decisions have shown elements of the regard for
the experience and vulnerability of those subject to the law, and sensitivity
to the consequential responsibilities and burdens of the judiciary, that is
sonorous with the dimensions of humility that I have drawn out in this
piece. As a result of this jurisprudence in substantive criminal law and
punishment, in recent years the court has sometimes been positioned as
the counterweight to a government with a “tough on crime” agenda.

59

See, e.g. R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ipeelee, [2012]
S.C.J. No. 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”].
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Yet over that same timespan there has been a quiet but powerful
countercurrent in the Court’s work in criminal justice: the steady
expansion of police powers and contraction of the pre-trial rights of the
accused. Indeed, one might observe that the progress and gains in
substantive criminal law and punishment, though hugely significant in
their domain, are somewhat “boutique” in nature, touching chiefly on
“grossly disproportionate” mandatory minimum sentences (which is a
fragment of the day-to-day punishment imposed by our criminal justice
system)60 and on the limitation of a set of offences that represent a small
component of the work done in our courts. When one turns to the vast
world of low-level, daily interactions between individuals and the police
— the world that fundamentally shapes communities’ experience of the
criminal justice system — the picture looks very different indeed. In a
series of deeply split decisions, a majority of the Court has either expanded
police powers or interpreted the scope of rights in a way that is highly
solicitous of those powers.
One might point to a number of cases to identify this other face of
the Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence,61 but consider just three: R. v.
Singh,62 R. v. Sinclair,63 and R. v. Clayton and Farmer.64 Chief Justice
McLachlin was in the majority in each. In Singh the Court was asked to
consider the scope of the right to silence in a circumstance in which the
accused had repeatedly asserted his right and expressed his desire not to
speak with the police. The police nevertheless persisted and obtained
incriminating information as a result. With the forceful objection of four
judges of the Court who were concerned that this evacuated the right for
those under the “dominance or control”65 of the police, the majority of the
Court held that the right to silence protected a “meaningful choice whether

By definition, indeed, this jurisprudence leaves the “merely disproportionate” sentence wholly
untouched, though such a sentence is unjust by the Criminal Code’s own standards.
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Other examples include R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Spencer”]; R. v. Saeed, [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 518 (S.C.C.).
62

[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”].
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[2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sinclair”].
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[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clayton”].
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Singh, supra note 62, at para. 66.
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to speak or to remain silent”66 and that, in the police interrogation setting,
as long as the accused’s statement was not rendered “involuntary” in the
meaning of the common law confessions rule,67 that accused should be
viewed as having made a real choice.
In Sinclair, the majority rejected the dissenting view that
understood the section 10(b) right to counsel as designed to “restore a
power-imbalance between the detainee and the police in the coercive
atmosphere of the police investigation",68 instead seeing the right as chiefly
informational in character, intended to give “the detainee the information
he needs to make a meaningful choice as to whether to cooperate with the
investigation or decline to do so.”69 As a result, and confirming past police
practice in Canada, McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. held that section 10(b)
will normally only entitle a detainee to a single consultation with counsel,
with further consultation permitted only when there has been a “material
change in the detainee’s situation”.70
And in Clayton, the Court was asked to clarify the scope of the new
power of investigative detention that, using the common law police
powers doctrine (or “Waterfield test”71) it had created in R. v. Mann.72
Whereas the power as articulated in Mann appeared narrowly
circumscribed, subject to Parliament legislating to enlarge it, the majority
in Clayton expanded the power to allow investigative detention whenever
it is “reasonably necessary” in the “totality of the circumstances.”73 In his
dissenting reasons in the 1985 case of Dedman v. The Queen, Dickson C.J.C.
had explained that “[s]hort of arrest, the police have never possessed legal
authority at common law to detain any one against his or her will for

66

Id., at para. 53.
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A rule that, it should be noted, the majority of the Court made significantly more difficult for
the police to breach in Spencer earlier that year.
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Sinclair, supra note 63, at para. 30.
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Id., at para. 47.
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Id., at para. 43.
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R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.).
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[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.).
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Clayton, supra note 64, at para. 30.
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questioning or to pursue an investigation.”74 With Clayton, and despite
deep and abiding societal concerns surrounding police practices of racial
profiling, the world described by Dickson C.J.C. was firmly in the rearview mirror.
The significance of these cases for present purposes is not that they
participate in a substantive countercurrent, standing in contrast with the
Court’s more skeptical posture towards criminalization and punishment.
Rather, most notable is that these decisions seem to lack key elements of
the virtue of judicial humility that I have argued were central to the
criminal justice cases of Winko, Khan, and Ferguson. The keen attentiveness
to the workings of power, and the particular vulnerabilities of those
subject to it, that was so prominent in McLachlin C.J.C.’s reasoning in
Winko and Khan is troublingly absent from these three police powers
decisions. Indeed, thinking through power and vulnerability in the
criminal justice system, and the Court’s responsibility in light of both, was
central to the Court’s reasoning in Bedford, Carter, Insite, and Ipeelee. Yet in
Singh and Sinclair, a formal approach to choice displaces careful attention
to the ways in which the radical asymmetries of power in the interrogation
room might structure an accused’s choices, and might do so especially for
those who are themselves less powerful, less informed, or less resilient. By
the light of these cases, the dominance enjoyed by police in the
interrogation room is not especially important to the right to silence, and
the right to counsel is not about correcting power imbalances. And in
Clayton, the experience of over-policing and profiling that is so central to
racialized communities’ experience of the criminal justice system does not
feature in the majority’s analysis, counselling a more cautious approach to
the expansion of police authority, as it should. Indeed, the expansion of
police powers using the common law in Clayton sits in tension with Chief
Justice McLachlin’s desire in Ferguson for the Court to occupy its
distinctive space, thereby calling on Parliament to wrestle with its own role
and choices, as well as the Khan Court’s critical engagement with history
in light of present systemic realities. The effect of these three cases is to
locate the Court in a deferential role in relationship with police power and
need. In short, these cases seem to lack the attentiveness to power,
vulnerability, and the role of others, as well as the consequences of one’s
74

[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 13 (S.C.C.).
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choices in light of all of this, that is essential to understanding and
accepting one’s appropriate place in relationship with others: the defining
feature of humility, richly understood.
Perhaps the most generous reading of these cases is that there is a
brand of humility at work in them. The field of police powers is one in
which the rights of the individual and the safety of the public are in overt
tension. The choices facing the courts in such cases have enormous
consequences for each side of this dynamic. And met with this, it is
perhaps tempting to occupy less judicial space, resiling from bolder
positions and leaving room for others to do their work without judicial
interference and in response to perceived need. But this is the form of
humility exercised by Rabbi Zechariah and to which the Talmud so
strenuously objects. So what would a genuinely humble jurisprudence of
police powers look like? One informed by the richer sense of humility that
I have developed here? Its starting point would be attention to the power
enjoyed by police and the vulnerability of those subject to that power. It
would involve a judiciary respectfully but critically engaged with the
common law and past police practice, but attuned to the courts’
overwhelming responsibility to ensure that the law is adapted to serve the
peculiar concerns and interests of the communities that it affects today. It
would see a judiciary assuming positions on police powers that call on
others — police and Parliament alike — to occupy their own space
responsibly. And resources for this humble posture towards police
powers are available in Chief Justice McLachlin’s broader work.
CONCLUSION: DUTIES OF THE HEART
We can do so much better than seeking to understand the very
complex role of a judge and of a court by examining matters through the
lens of “judicial activism”. Picking up that lens, we are apt to see the
responsibilities and roles of the judge very thinly, indeed. Within this
frame, our ethical antennae are tuned to the risk that a court will do too
much, and as a result the principal counsel is one of restraint. This is a
pallid image of what we ask of a judge. In search of a language that better
captures our hopes for the judicial role, the virtue of humility is an
appealing offer. But I have argued in this piece that our understanding of
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the virtue of humility should not be one solely associated with being
“smaller” or constructed as a counterpoint to arrogance. Understood only
in that way, I’m not certain that we have made much of an advance on
“activism” in respect of the complexity with which we see the judge’s role.
Instead, I have urged a conception of humility as the effort to occupy one’s
appropriate place in relationship with others. We will continue to disagree
about whether this conception of humility was realized in a given case,
and that is fine and good because it offers a richer language in which to
discuss what qualities we wish to see in those who exercise the judicial
role. And this understanding of humility indeed encodes much that I
think we want from our judges: the enormous goods of compassion,
willingness to learn, acceptance of fallibility, yes; but also responsibility,
attentiveness to power and vulnerability, and courage. Understood in this
way, humility seems a foundational virtue, a pathway to other ethical
goods, other virtues we would ask of our judges.
Rabbi Bachya ibn Pakuda thought so. He was a rabbi and
philosopher who lived in Al-Andalus in the 11th century. His project was
to generate the first systematic vision of Jewish ethics and his masterwork
was a volume entitled The Duties of the Heart.75 In that book, Rabbi Bachya
poses the question, “on what do the [other] virtues depend?” His answer?
“All virtues and duties are dependent on humility.”76 It seems to me that
this is because humility is, at core, a question of one’s relationship with
others. Aware of others — attuned to their needs, experiences,
vulnerabilities, and our responsibilities in relation to each — we should
seek to occupy no more but also no less space than is appropriate. And if
humility, so understood, is indeed the foundational virtue, this brings us
into conversation with another, more modern, tradition of Jewish thought:
that ethics is generated out of the encounter with the other and from the
experience of being awash in the richness of their specificity and the
flooding complexity of their lived experience.77
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Beverley McLachlin’s jurisprudence is marked by that awareness of
others and sense of responsibility towards them. In her judgments, one
finds a deep and abiding desire to understand the complex ways that
people find themselves in the world and a genuine wrestling with what
this means for the role of a judge. That interest in people’s condition in
our society, and concern with law’s role in making that condition better —
or at least not allowing it to make things worse — is an ethical instinct that
has animated her contributions to Canadian law. Winko, Khan, Ferguson,
and a host of other cases are evidence of this. And where I have critiqued
her decisions, it has been out of respect for this instinct and my sense that
it could have been better realized in a given case. We can ask for little more
than a judge who has insistently asked the question of the appropriate
space for a court to occupy in light of power, vulnerability, and the role of
others, and in so doing to have offered us resources for thinking more
deeply about the virtue of humility.
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